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Abstract 
This study examines the effect of external and relational uncertainty on the governance choice for 
inter-organizational technology sourcing. We develop a number of hypotheses about the impact of 
environmental turbulence, technological newness, technological distance and prior cooperation on the 
choice between different governance modes. Data about external technology sourcing transactions in 
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EXTERNAL TECHNOLOGY SOURCING: THE EFFECT OF 
UNCERTAINTY ON GOVERNANCE MODE CHOICE  
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This paper analyzes the effect of uncertainty on the choice companies have between different 
governance modes to source externally developed technology. External technology sourcing as a 
means to develop new businesses is taking a more central role in established companies. Acquiring 
new technologies from outside the firm which speeds up the innovation process and complements 
internal R&D is an important aspect of new business development within the paradigm of open 
innovation. It is becoming a requirement to create and sustain competitive advantage in different 
product markets, and to respond quickly to changing market needs and new technological 
opportunities.  
Companies that co-develop technology or in-source external technology to set up new 
business can choose from a myriad of different sourcing modes. Traditionally, firms have emphasized 
strategic alliances, joint ventures, license agreements and mergers and acquisitions. More recently, 
firms have also become aware of other options such as corporate venture capital investments and 
technology exploration in cooperation with research labs, universities, high-tech start-ups or other 
large companies. Innovating companies can choose between these external technology sourcing 
modes in order to react in a flexible way to new technological developments and changing market 
conditions. In this paper, we distinguish among corporate venture capital investments, non-equity 
technology alliances, joint ventures, minority holdings, and mergers and acquisitions. Although other 
technology sourcing modes exist, these are most important ones in our opinion. 
 The choice companies have between these modes is largely determined by the uncertainty 
surrounding the investment decision. We argue that uncertainty can be roughly divided into two 
groups: exogenous uncertainty, which is unaffected by firm's actions, and endogenous uncertainty, 
which is embedded in the relationship and can be reduced by actions of the firm. Exogenous 
uncertainty, for instance, exists when the environment is unpredictable and subject to fast and 
frequent change, referred to in this study as environmental turbulence. High-technology environments 
are typically characterized by unpredictable change fostered by radical innovations and therefore 
entail a rather high level of environmental turbulence. When the environment is turbulent, innovating 
firms attach more value in keeping their options open. Hence, they will prefer to maximize flexibility 
and prefer to make small (learning) investments, which facilitate reversibility of actions in 
combination with low degrees of financial commitments. Once uncertainty has decreased because of 
the initial investment, firms can still decide upon a larger follow-on investment. 
 Another important source of uncertainty within new business development projects is 
technological newness. When an innovating firm intends to source nascent technologies, uncertainty 
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about the future business potential of the technology is very high. High uncertainty surrounding new 
technologies makes it more valuable for the investing firm to make small, initial investments reducing 
the uncertainty about the business opportunity. Therefore, when the technology of partners is an 
emerging technology, innovating companies will be more likely to pursue sourcing modes that are 
less integrated and easier to reverse - such as strategic alliances and corporate venture capital 
investments – in order to remain flexible. 
 Uncertainty may also exist within a technology sourcing relationship. For instance, when two 
partners have a relatively small technological overlap (i.e. when the technological distance is high) it 
might be difficult for the investing firm to recognize and absorb its partner's technological 
capabilities. On the one hand, this might lead to a preference for more integrated modes which require 
a higher level of commitment. A higher level of integration is necessary to increase the efficiency of 
the transfer and accumulation of knowledge. Moreover, dissimilar knowledge bases make it more 
difficult to write contracts, hence making more integration and a higher level of control favorable. 
One the other hand, the greater the dissimilarities in the knowledge bases, the longer it will take 
before uncertainty about the opportunity is resolved, making a higher level of commitment less 
attractive. Instead, it is better to first build familiarity through small, educational investments or 
through alliances or joint ventures. In this way, the investing company creates an option while 
learning about the opportunity ahead. When partnering companies learn more about each technology 
over time (i.e. when technological distance shrinks), higher levels of integration becomes more 
attractive. Thus, technological distance between the innovating firm and its partners is an important 
indicator of endogenous uncertainty with considerable implications for the choice between different 
external technology sourcing modes.  
Another important indicator for endogenous uncertainty is the existence of prior cooperation 
between the partners. Prior cooperation can be used to overcome information asymmetry among 
partners, which occurs when they do not have access to all the relevant information to make an 
investment decision. Therefore, we expect that prior cooperation enhances the willingness of 
companies to enter into a relationship that is less reversible and that involves a higher level of 
commitment. However, one might also argue that prior cooperation enhances the building of trust 
between partners, thus making a more integrated solution less favorable. 
Based on a sample consisting of the largest companies in the pharmaceutical industry, we find 
that there is no support for an ordinal ranking of the different external sourcing modes as has been 
suggested many times in the literature. However, depending on the type of uncertainty, we find a clear 
preference for particular governance modes. Under high levels of environmental turbulence, non-
equity technology alliances are clearly the most favorable option. Technological newness has a strong, 
negative effect on the likelihood of using M&As and joint ventures instead of non-equity alliances. 
However, the results also show a clear preference for the use of CVC over non-equity alliances. A 
larger technological distance between two firms also increases the chance to use CVC investments 
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over non-equity alliances, whereas minority holdings are the least favored option.. The strong 
preference for CVCs to source externally developed technology that is distant from the focal firms 
technology core shows the particular role CVCs play in external technology sourcing. Finally, when 
prior cooperation between firms exists, we find that minority holdings and joint ventures are preferred 
over non-equity alliances, but we find no differential effect between the use of non-equity alliances 
and M&As.  
To conclude, the results indicate that the benefits of using a particular type of external 
technology sourcing mode depend on the type of uncertainty - external and relational – the companies 
are coping with. This implies that each governance mode has its own strengths and weaknesses to 
cope with environmental turbulence, emerging technologies, technological distance between partners 
and technology sourcing in the wake of prior cooperation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper discusses the effect of exogenous and endogenous uncertainty on the choice between 
different governance modes for external technology sourcing. External technology sourcing as a 
means to develop new businesses is taking a more central role in the innovation processes of 
organizations. Acquiring new technologies from outside the firm which enhance internal R&D is an 
important aspect of the new business development process, needed to sustain competitive advantage 
and to respond quickly to changing market needs and to new technological opportunities 
(Chesbrough, 2003; Grandstrand et al. 1992, 1997; Jones et al., 2001; Tsai and Wang., 2007). 
Companies that co-develop technology or in-source external technology to set up new business can 
choose from a myriad of different sourcing modes. Traditionally, firms have emphasized strategic 
alliances, joint ventures, license agreements and mergers and acquisitions. More recently, firms have 
also become aware of other options such as corporate venture capital investments (Allen and Hevert, 
2007; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005a, 2005b, 2006) and technology exploration in cooperation with 
research labs and universities (George et al., 2002). Innovating companies can choose between these 
external technology sourcing modes in order to react in a flexible way to new technological 
developments and changing market conditions.  
 In this paper we aim to contribute to the literature in the following areas. First, we offer a 
detailed analysis of the role of uncertainty in government mode choice, focusing specifically on 
technology sourcing, which has become an important driver to enhance the development of new 
business. We will draw on both transaction cost economics (TCE) and real options theory (RO) to 
develop our arguments. Second, we will expand the range of mode-types under study. 
 
The role of uncertainty in governance mode choices 
Prior studies have pointed to different drivers for governance mode choice, including frequency, asset 
specificity and uncertainty (e.g. Folta, 1998; Mahoney, 1992; Sutcliff and Zaheer, 1998). Although all 
of these factors are important to consider, the role of uncertainty as a central driver for sourcing 
decisions seems to be a recurrent issue in the context of new business development. Despite its well-
recognized importance, systematic empirical studies on the role of uncertainty in governance mode 
choices for external venturing have been relatively sparse. In particular, previous studies have not 
taken into account the impact of different forms of uncertainty on governance mode choice (Mahoney, 
1992; Sutcliff and Zaheer, 1998). Uncertainty with respect to governance mode decisions can roughly 
be divided into two types: exogenous and endogenous uncertainty (Folta, 1998). Exogenous or 
environmental uncertainty is unaffected by firm actions and predominantly resolves over time as new 
technologies become mature. Technology sourcing often occurs for the purpose of new business 
development, in which the future potential of the technologies being acquired is still unknown. In 
addition to that, the technological environment is turbulent, making predictions about the future even 
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more difficult. Hence, exogenous uncertainty might take the form of environmental turbulence or 
technological newness. Endogenous or relational uncertainty on the other hand can often be found as 
taking the shape of relationship-specific uncertainty when firms are sourcing technologies externally 
for new business development. This type of uncertainty is typically represented by dissimilarities 
among partners which can be caused for instance by different knowledge bases or by the lack of prior 
cooperation to overcome information asymmetries.  
 
An expansion of the range of governance modes 
Additionally, previous research discussing the choice among different modes for external technology 
sourcing has been fairly narrow in scope, as it has primarily focused on the choice between different 
types of strategic alliances (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Santoro and McGill, 2005) or between strategic 
alliances and M&As (Folta and Leiblein, 1994; Garette and Dussauge, 2000; Hagedoorn and 
Duysters, 2002; Hoffmann and Schaper-Rinkel, 2001; Lambe and Spekman, 1997; Roberts and Liu, 
2001; Vanhaverbeke, et al., 2002). Another body of literature has paid attention to the growing 
importance of corporate venture capital (CVC) as a strategy to acquire new technologies (e.g. 
Dushnitksy and Lenox, 2005a). Despite the increased emphasis on the use of CVC as a driver for 
innovative output, in studies on external technology sourcing this organizational mode has not yet 
been incorporated as an alternative compared to strategic alliances and/or M&As. Although it is 
evident that innovating firms choose between a wide spectrum of technology sourcing and developing 
modes, comparing a broader set of technological sourcing modes has not been analyzed in a 
systematic way. Therefore, to get the full picture of how companies use different modes of external 
corporate venturing, it is important to address the issue raised here in a more comprehensive way, 
incorporating corporate venture capital as a distinct strategy.  
 In this paper we distinguish among corporate venture capital investments, non-equity 
technology alliances, joint ventures, minority holdings, and mergers and acquisitions. Although other 
technology sourcing modes exist, these are most important from an external corporate venturing 
perspective (Keil, 2002; Schildt et al., 2005). In addition, the modes listed here incorporate a full 
range of options that can be ranked along the continuum between arms-length transactions and a fully 
integrated solution (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Hagedoorn and Sadowski, 1999; Nielsen, 2002; Santoro 
and McGill, 2005; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005). In the remainder of this paper the terms less and 
more integrated governance modes will be used, referring to the continuum discussed here, ranging 
from non-equity alliances as the less integrated mode of governances, respectively followed by CVC 
investments, minority holdings, joint ventures, and M&As, the latter being the mostly integrated 
governance mode. 
 This paper is organized as follows. First, we will provide a more detailed background to 
develop some hypotheses on how different types of uncertainty affect the choice for more or less 
integrated governance modes. Second, we will test the hypotheses using a longitudinal dataset 
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comprising data on inter-organizational relationships of the largest companies in the pharmaceutical 
industry. This section includes a description of the data, the variables included in the study and the 
methods used. Next, we present and discuss the results, followed by the conclusions and some 
suggestions for further research. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Corporate entrepreneurship entails the development of new business by established firms. 
Increasingly important in the recognition of opportunities and the development of new business, is the 
use of external sources of knowledge. These external sources can either be informal (e.g. forums, 
informal networks, or mentors (Ozgen and Baron, 2007)) or formal (e.g. interfirm networks, R&D 
partnerships). As noted by Jarillo (1989), "networks" are becoming more and more important for 
entrepreneurial firms to achieve growth and to increase its new product performance (Soh, 2003). 
Studies by Barringer and Bluedorn (1999) and Zahra (1991) show that scanning of the environment 
and corporate entrepreneurship are strongly correlated, indicating that the pursuit of entrepreneurial 
opportunities often is dependent on the systematic scanning of the environment. Moreover, in order to 
prevent core competences from becoming obsolete, strategic renewal outside the existing business 
becomes more important. Open innovation and the external sourcing of new technologies is an 
important vehicle to ensure corporate renewal (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Vanhaverbeke and Peeters, 
2005) and hence to sustain the competitive advantage of firms. 
 Traditionally, M&As and strategic alliances have been emphasized as a means to source new 
technology externally. However, the use of other mechanisms, such as corporate venture capital and 
university partnerships are becoming increasingly important. Both are focused on the earlier stages of 
technology development and are therefore an interesting mechanism to enhance corporate 
entrepreneurial efforts. For instance, George et al. (2002) show that biotech firms with university 
linkages have higher innovation output than others, while their R&D expenses have decreased. 
Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005a) furthermore found a positive relationship between CVC investments 
and future patent citation levels. Moreover, firms investing corporate venture capital have explicitly 
mentioned scanning of the environment as one of the main objectives (e.g. Keil, 2002; Siegel et al., 
1988; Sykes, 1990; Winters & Murfin, 1988). CVC investments provide the company with access to 
nascent technologies with highly uncertain future potential. When investing in these technologies, 
firms need to remain flexible in order to being able to withdraw from the commitment as soon as it 
seems not to be promising. Therefore, alliances or M&As might be less attractive to source these 
types of technologies. In this paper, we will focus our attention on the choice companies have 
between corporate venture capital, non-equity alliances, minority holdings, joint ventures and M&As. 
Although other technology sourcing modes exist, we believe that these are most commonly used in 
external corporate venturing (Keil, 2002; Schildt et al., 2005). 
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The continuum of governance modes 
Traditionally, organizational theory has distinguished between markets and hierarchies, where firms 
are regarded as hierarchical entities, interacting with other firms through market transactions 
(Williamson, 1975). However, as noted by Powell (1990), the existing boundaries of firms are 
blurring as they engage in different types of interorganizatinal contracting that falls between arms-
length market transactions and vertical integration. These arrangements can take the form of joint 
ventures, strategic alliances, or other forms of interorganizational collaboration. Previous studies have 
argued that these modes of collaboration can be ranked along the continuum between arms-length 
transactions and a fully integrated solution (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Hagedoorn and Sadowski, 1999; 
Nielsen, 2002; Santoro and McGill, 2005; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005). For example, Gulati and 
Singh (1998) distinguish between joint ventures, minority holdings and strategic alliances, ranking 
joint ventures at the hierarchical end of the continuum, followed respectively by minority holdings 
and strategic alliances towards the market-transaction end. Santoro and McGill (2005) distinguish and 
rank a number of alliance governance modes, ranging from licensing at the market end of the 
continuum, followed by cross-licensing, bilateral alliances, and minority equity alliances, to equity 
joint ventures at the hierarchy end. 
In a similar vein, we argue that the governance modes used in this paper (non-equity 
technology alliances, CVC investments, minority holdings, joint ventures and M&As) can also be 
ranked along the same continuum. Non-equity technology alliances have few hierarchical controls and 
are hence the most flexible form of cooperation, entailing a relatively low level of control over its 
partner. Moreover, non-equity alliances represent low levels of irreversible commitment due to the 
lack of equity involved. As a result, non-equity technology alliances come closest to market 
transactions. CVC investments and minority holdings, in which the investing company takes a 
minority share in another firm, are also a flexible form of cooperation, though the level of control is 
greater than in strategic alliances, partly because of the equity participation. Although both types of 
investments are in fact minority holdings, a clear distinction between the two exists. CVC investments 
typically occur in start-up firms and are normally organized in the focal firm by means of the 
establishment of a separate organizational unit with allocated funds. In addition to that, interaction 
between the venture and the investing firm usually occurs via the CVC unit (Schildt et al, 2005). 
Minority holdings, on the other hand, are usually carried out by a business unit and often occur as a 
means to gain control in a strategic alliance or as a first step towards a merger or acquisition. Hence, it 
can be argued that in terms of commitment and flexibility, CVC investments are more flexible and 
involve less commitment and as a result are positioned more towards the arms-length end of the 
continuum, followed by minority holdings. Joint ventures represent a higher level of integration, due 
to the increasing involvement of equity and the establishment of a new organizational entity. Finally, 
M&As represent the highest level of vertical integration as the partner (or target) company is fully 
controlled by the investing firm. 
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 HYPOTHESES 
 
Exogenous and endogenous uncertainty 
When estimating the effect of uncertainty on the use of different governance modes, it is important to 
note that uncertainty exists in many forms and that each form may have a different impact on the 
governance mode choice (Mahoney, 1992; Sutcliff and Zaheer, 1998). Uncertainty affecting 
governance mode decisions can roughly be divided among two groups: exogenous and endogenous 
uncertainty (Folta, 1998). Exogenous uncertainty refers to uncertainty that 'is largely unaffected by 
firm actions' (Folta, 1998: 1011) and largely resolves over time. Exogenous uncertainty might take the 
form of environmental turbulence, but also technological newness is exogenous to the investing firm. 
Real options theory mainly deals with exogenous uncertainty, where the value of the option is 
determined by the uncertainty surrounding the investment. Endogenous uncertainty on the other hand 
refers to uncertainty that 'can be decreased by actions of the firm' (Folta, 1998: 1010). Endogenous 
uncertainty can often be found as taking the shape of relationship-specific uncertainty when firms are 
sourcing technologies externally for new business development. This type of uncertainty is typically 
represented by dissimilarities among partners which can be caused for instance by different knowledge 
bases or by the lack of prior cooperation to overcome information asymmetries. Both TCE and RO 
can be applied to decision-making under endogenous uncertainty, since they both stress a different 
perspective. RO stresses the value that is embedded in the uncertainty about the opportunity and 
gradually decreases as a result from learning investments. TCE takes on a different perspective in 
which hierarchy is presented as a way to circumvent the costs that are associated with the writing of 
contracts under higher levels of uncertainty.  
 
Environmental turbulence 
High-technology environments are typically characterized by unpredictable change fostered by radical 
innovations and therefore entail a rather high level of environmental turbulence. When the 
environment is turbulent, it becomes more valuable for innovating firms to keep their options open. 
Hence, they will prefer to maximize flexibility in this stage while uncertainty decreases and a possible 
follow-on investment can be decided upon (Van de Vrande et al., 2006). Therefore, under these 
circumstances, innovating firms will typically choose for less integrated governance modes with a 
lower level of financial commitment to reduce the potential costs associated with environmental 
turbulence in general and technology changes in particular (Sutcliffe and Zaheer, 1998). Not only can 
these types of investment be reversed more easily once outcomes are not satisfying, they also allow 
the investing company to bet on more than one horse at the same time. By investing simultaneously in 
different arrays of (competing) technology, the firm reduces the risk of being locked in a limited few 
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(Moon, 1998). Moreover, such a strategy enhances the firm's ability to respond quickly to changing 
environments.  
 Previous research has indicated the preference among companies facing turbulent or uncertain 
environments to favor flexibility over control. In support of this, Hagedoorn and Duysters (2002) find 
that industries that are characterized by rapid technological change ask for flexible forms of 
organization that enable quick strategic response. In their analysis, they find firms to favor alliances 
over of M&As. Following RO arguments, Folta (1998) and Moon (1998) found that technological 
turbulence leads to a preference for equity collaborations over acquisitions, whereas Santoro and 
McGill (2005) show how the dynamism of the technological subfield of an alliance negatively affects 
the use of more hierarchical alliance forms. Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt (1986), furthermore, show 
how integration is negatively affected by the frequency of technological change, an effect that holds 
specifically if the degree of competition is high. This view to delay financial commitment when 
uncertainty is high is also confirmed in studies investigating entrepreneurial entry (O'Brien et al., 
2003) and partner buyouts (Folta and Miller, 2002). 
 To sum up, environmental turbulence seems to be a forceful driver to delay commitment and 
to keep different investment options open. The flexibility generated by real options allows firms to 
cope with unforeseen contingencies and facilitates reversibility of actions in combination with low 
degrees of financial commitments. Hence, we hypothesize that when environmental turbulence is 
high, companies are more likely to use less integrated governance modes that are more flexible, and 
involve a lower level of commitment. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Environmental turbulence has a negative effect on the use of more integrated 
governance modes.  
 
Technological newness 
Another important source of uncertainty within new business development projects is the uncertain 
business potential of the product or technology the firm invests in. Uncertainty with respect to the 
technological characteristics and the of market feasibility products or technologies cannot easily be 
reduced by the investing firm, but typically decreases over time as the technology matures and the 
innovating firm gets a better understanding of the technology and its market potential thanks to 
subsequent R&D or learning investments. When a technology is in an early stage of development, its 
basic concepts stem from practice, thereby raising the uncertainties associated with it (Ahuja and 
Lampert, 2001). Additionally, the possible success of the innovation is more uncertain in nascent 
technologies (Sahal, 1985). Hence, the high uncertainty surrounding new technologies makes it more 
valuable for the investing firm to make small, initial investments reducing the uncertainty about the 
business opportunity. Those early (and small) investments can be regarded to as learning investments 
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(Janney and Dess, 2004) and intent to bring down the uncertainty through technological and market 
feasibility studies. Therefore, when the technology of the partner is rather new, companies will be 
more likely to pursue agreements that are more towards the market-transaction end of the continuum, 
such as strategic alliances and corporate venture capital investments, in order to remain flexible 
(Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002). 
 Previous studies have also pointed to the use of less integrated governance modes under 
conditions of technological newness. Pisano (1990), for instance, found that in the early days of 
biotechnology, technological uncertainty has played a critical role in established firms' decision to 
acquire biotechnology R&D from the outside. In addition to that, Lambe and Spekman (1997) argue 
that in the early stages of the technology life cycle where industry uncertainty is high, alliances take 
precedence over the two other options (make and buy) for acquiring new technology. Moreover, 
Steensma and Fairbank (1999) find that under conditions of high uncertainty (with respect to 
technological and commercial success), arms-length arrangements such as licensing are more likely to 
being pursued than joint development or acquisitions. 
 To sum up, when the technology of the partner firm is rather new and hence its success is 
unpredictable, it becomes more valuable for the investing firm to make small, learning investments. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that in the case of technological newness, the investing firm will be more 
likely to use less integrated governance modes that are highly reversible and involve a lower level of 
commitment.  
 
Hypothesis 2. Technological newness has a negative effect on the use of more integrated 
governance modes. 
 
Technological distance 
Dissimilarities between the knowledge bases of two partners might have an effect on the choice of the 
governance mode to shape their cooperation. Larger dissimilarities lead to two types of problems; the 
first one is related to he limited capability to detect, assimilate and integrate technology that is quite 
different from a firms' core technologies. Next, larger technological distance between two partners 
may also lead to relational uncertainty forcing them to safeguard against opportunistic behavior of the 
other. 
The first type of problem is typically related to the absorptive capacity of firms. The more 
dissimilar the knowledge bases of two partners, the larger the probability that the absorptive capacity 
of the investing firm falls short, affecting the extent to which a firm can recognize and absorb its 
partner's technological capabilities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). One can 
argue that partnering firms will choose governance modes that are more integrated in order to 
facilitate the effective transfer of distant knowledge (Cantwell & Colombo, 2000; Gulati & Singh, 
1998; Mowery et al., 1996; Sampson, 2004). For instance, Colombo (2003) finds support for the 
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hypothesis that divergence in partner's technological specialization increases the propensity to use 
equity alliances over non-equity alliances. 
Second, larger technological distance between the partners and its associated absorptive 
capacity problems also leads to endogenous or relational uncertainty, i.e. the uncertainty within the 
technology sourcing relationship or the uncertainty between the partners which is typical for the TCE 
approach (Williamson, 1975, 1985)4. Large technological distance between two partners might lead to 
adverse selection. When the technological distance between the partners is high, information 
asymmetries emerge, which might result in the selection of inferior technologies. It can be argued that 
in order to overcome the danger of adverse selection, a higher level of integration is favorable to cope 
with information asymmetries and to protect the investing against for opportunistic behavior from its 
partner. Moreover, higher levels of technological distance between partners imply higher levels of 
uncertainty, which makes it more costly and more complicated to write complete contracts. As a 
result, a higher level of integration becomes a more attractive alternative (Williamson, 1975).  
 To sum up, when the knowledge bases of the firms involved in a technology sourcing 
partnership are dissimilar, a higher level of integration is necessary to increase the efficient transfer 
and accumulation of knowledge. Moreover, dissimilar knowledge bases increase the danger of 
adverse selection and make it more difficult to write contracts, hence making a higher level of 
integration more favorable. As a measure for dissimilarity among technological competences, we use 
technological distance between the firms. We hypothesize that when technological distance is high, 
companies will use more integrated governance modes entailing a higher level of hierarchical control. 
 
Hypothesis 3a. Technological distance between the focal firm and its partner has a positive 
effect on the use of more integrated governance modes 
 
On the other hand, the greater the knowledge base dissimilarities, the longer it will take before the 
uncertainty about the opportunity will be resolved, making a higher level of commitment less 
attractive. Instead, it is better to first build familiarity through small, educational investments or 
through alliances or joint ventures (Roberts and Berry, 1985). In this way, the investing company 
creates an option while learning about the opportunity ahead (Van de Vrande et al., 2006). When the 
knowledge bases are more converged, a higher level of integration becomes more attractive. In 
addition, Nooteboom (2004) argues that exploration requires a loosening of linkages with large 
cognitive distance, whereas exploitation should be conducted through more integration and small 
cognitive distance, hence stressing the likelihood of combining large technological distance with less 
                                                     
4 According to TCE logic, three types of problems typically arise during the transaction: adverse selection, 
moral hazard, and hold-up. In this section, we limit our attention to the danger of adverse selection, since 
adverse selection is typically an issue that might result from technological distance. Moral hazard and hold-up 
on the other hand are more related to the transaction and the threat of opportunistic behavior in general and will 
be discussed in relation to prior cooperation. 
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integration and vice versa. Moreover, opportunistic behavior is not a real threat as long as the business 
potential of the technology is not crystallized into a viable business model. In other words, firms that 
are not yet familiar with the technological capabilities of its partners will first have to learn from each 
other before being able to accumulate the knowledge. Thus, greater technological distance makes 
unintended spill-over of knowledge less likely, decreasing the threat of opportunistic behavior 
(Colombo, 2003).  
 Supporting this view, Folta (1998) finds that in case of dissimilar business operations between 
partners, equity collaboration is preferred over acquisitions, whereas Villalonga and McGahan (2005) 
come to the conclusion that the relatedness between the focal firm and its partner is associated with 
the choice of acquisitions over alliances and alliances over divestures. Hagedoorn and Duysters 
(2002) furthermore find support for their hypothesis that M&As are more likely when the external 
source of innovative capability is related to the company's core business (thus, when technological 
distance is small), and that strategic alliances are more likely for non-core businesses. In addition to 
that, Vassolo et al. (2004) find that lower technological distance enhances the likelihood of that an 
alliance partner is being acquired. 
 In sum, when the partnering firms have dissimilar knowledge bases, the need for learning and 
flexibility prevails over the need for administrative control. Technological distance between the firms 
is used as a measure for dissimilarity of technological competences between the partners. When 
technological distance is high we expect that companies will use less integrated governance modes to 
increase learning effects that might result from the relationship. Moreover, the use of less integrated 
governance modes enables those same firms to reverse their commitments at lower sunk costs at any 
point in time. Therefore, we hypothesize an alternative to Hypothesis 3a: technological distance has a 
positive effect on the use of more flexible governance modes that involve a lower level of 
commitment, and hence are less integrated. 
 
Hypothesis 3b. Technological distance between the focal firm and its partner has a negative 
effect on the use of more integrated governance modes 
 
Prior cooperation 
In the case of new business development, technology sourcing partnerships often take multiple forms 
over time. As new technologies are developed and commercialized, subsequent inter-organizational 
transactions should be in line with the decreasing external uncertainty and the need to increase the 
level of commitment. As a result, different governance modes will be preferred as an innovation 
proceeds through the development and commercialization stages. 
 As discussed above, technological distance between the innovating firm and its partners is an 
important indicator of endogenous uncertainty. Another important indicator for endogenous 
uncertainty is the existence of prior cooperation between the partners. Prior cooperation can be used 
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to overcome information asymmetry among partners (Reuer and Koza, 2000; Vanhaverbeke et al., 
2002; Williamson, 1985). Information asymmetry occurs when firms do not have access to all the 
relevant information to make an investment decision. As mentioned before, the uncertainty within the 
technology partnership might be decreased by using small, initial investments to learn about the 
partner and its technology. This facilitates more familiarity with the technologies and practices of the 
partner firm. Real options reasoning suggests that under circumstances of uncertainty, these initial 
investments are also a way to put off commitment until the potential of the opportunity has become 
more tangible. If we extend this logic to the choice between different governance modes given prior 
cooperation, this leads to the suggestion that the inter-organizational transaction entails a higher level 
of commitment. 
 This point of view is supported by Duysters and De Man (2003) in their concept of transitory 
alliances, which are flexible alliance forms that might be intensified and become a more traditional 
alliance when the opportunity seems promising. Information asymmetry can be decreased 
substantially through prior cooperation. Furthermore, Garette and Dussauge (2000) draw attention to 
the fact that scale alliances might be the first step towards a merger. Some empirical evidence stresses 
this perspective, arguing that prior cooperation is an effective way to overcome information 
asymmetries that might exist among partners in a technology sourcing relationship. Balakrishnan and 
Koza (1993) argue that when information asymmetries exist, joint ventures are preferred over 
acquisitions, because information asymmetry strongly increases the costs of valuing the target. 
Vanhaverbeke et al. (2002) found empirical evidence for this argument, suggesting that as soon as the 
information asymmetry has been resolved as a result from the interaction within the alliance, a firm 
will move from a strategic alliance to an acquisition. Additionally, Kogut (1991) describes how joint 
ventures may be acquired later on. Following the arguments presented above, we expect that prior 
cooperation enhances the willingness of companies to enter into a relationship that is less reversible 
and that involves a higher level of commitment. Or, alternatively, if there is no prior cooperation we 
expect companies to opt for a governance mode that is less integrated and hence easier to reverse. We 
therefore hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 4a. Prior cooperation has a positive effect on the use of more integrated 
governance modes. 
 
On the other hand, there is also a body of literature suggesting the opposite. Endogenous problems 
such as moral hazard and hold-up can be reduced through prior cooperation. Moral hazard refers to 
the threat of opportunistic behavior which occurs under circumstances of tacit knowledge. Prior 
cooperation is one way to learn about that knowledge and reduces the threat of opportunistic behavior. 
The problem of opportunistic behavior in contractual relations that require transaction specific 
investments – referred to as hold-up – can also be mitigated by prior and thus recurrent cooperation. 
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In fact, more prior cooperation creates trust, which in turn reduces the fear for opportunistic behavior, 
thereby decreasing the need for control. Gulati (1995) found empirical evidence supporting this view. 
In his study about the choice among different governance structures for alliances, he finds evidence 
that prior ties between the partners reduces the likelihood that the next alliance between them will be 
equity based. Moreover, Reuer et al. (2006) show that trust leads firms to use non-equity alliances 
over equity alliances, whereas Villalonga and McGahan (2005) find support for the hypothesis that 
prior alliances positively affect the choice for alliances over acquisitions. In addition to that, Santoro 
and McGill (2005) found that the lack of prior ties induces companies to use of more hierarchical 
governance modes. Also Ring and Van der Ven (1994) have shown that trust is an essential condition 
for market transactions. If we extent this view to the broader spectrum of inter-organizational 
relationships, it can be argued that prior cooperation allows the investing company to use of 
governance modes that involve a lower level of commitment. Consequently, we propose an alternative 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4b. Prior cooperation has a negative effect on the use of more integrated 
governance modes. 
 
METHODS 
 
Data and Sample 
To test the hypotheses, we use a sample consisting of all corporate venture capital investments, non-
equity technology alliances, equity alliances, and mergers and acquisitions completed between 1990 
and 2000 by the 153 largest companies that were active in the pharmaceutical industry during the 
observation period. The dyad-level dataset is cross-sectional and comprises 1,810 deals: 783 of these 
deals are technology alliances, 129 corporate venture capital investments, 206 minority holdings, 125 
joint ventures, and 567 mergers and acquisitions.  
 The dataset was constructed in the following way. First, we have selected the largest 
companies in the pharmaceutical industry between 1990 and 2000. We focused on the largest 
companies in the industry in order to have a consistent set of firms over that observation period. 
Moreover, small (or privately held) firms do not disclose the relevant information. Prior research on 
alliances and acquisitions has for that reason also been focused on the largest companies in the 
industry (Ahuja, 2000; Gulati, 1995; Gulati and Garguilo, 1999; Hitt et al., 1991, 1996). The firms 
were selected based on their prior patents in the industry. For each year of the observation period, the 
200 companies with the largest cumulative number of patents in the industry were collected. Selection 
was based on patents filed in the following patent classes: 424, 435, 436, 514, 530, 536, 800, and 930. 
After selecting the companies with the largest cumulative number of patents in the relevant patent 
classes, research institutes and universities were removed from the sample. Next, the remaining 
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sample was manually checked for parents and affiliates using Dun & Bradstreet's Who Owns Whom, 
which were then aggregated on parent company level. After checking for duplicates, this leads to 153 
independent companies to be included in the sample. We will refer to these independent companies as 
"focal firms", to distinguish them from their partners.  
 Next, we have gathered for these firms all the venture capital investments, technology 
alliances, minority holdings, joint ventures, and merger and acquisition activity during the period 
1985-2000, as well as patent data and financial information. Corporate venture capital data was 
derived from the Thomson VentureXpert database, data concerning alliances and joint ventures was 
obtained from the MERIT-CATI databank on Cooperative Agreements and Technology Indicators 
(Hagedoorn, 1993), and we used Thomson ONE Banker to collect information regarding the 
companies' M&A activity. Because the collected alliances and corporate venture capital investments 
have a strong technology component, we included only technological M&As in the sample, following 
the method proposed by Ahuja and Katila (2001)5. 
 MERIT-CATI distinguishes 22 types of inter-organizational relationships, including joint 
ventures and minority holdings. Thomson ONE Banker also includes joint ventures and minority 
equity investments. Thus, it might occur that one deal is reported more than once, due to the merger of 
different data sources containing the same information. Therefore, all entries were checked for 
duplicates (i.e. same firms, same type of investment, but different source), which were then removed 
from the sample. In the case of duplicates among minority holdings and CVC investments, minority 
holdings were removed. After all, every CVC investment is also a minority holding, but not every 
minority holding can be regarded as a CVC investment. We therefore follow CVC investments as 
reported in VentureXpert. 
Financial data was gathered using Worldscope, including sales, research and development expenses 
and number of employees. In addition to that, we collected patent information for all firms included in 
the sample using data from the US Patent and Trademark Office. Because the US Patent and 
Trademark Office grants patents both on subsidiary as well as on parent company level (Patel & 
Pavitt, 1997), and the organizational level on which patents are applied for differs between 
companies, the patents were manually consolidated on parent company level for each observation 
year, using Who Owns Whom by Dun & Bradstreet. 
 
Dependent variable 
Because we want to predict the effect of different types of uncertainty on governance mode choice, 
the dependent variable indicates the type of inter-organizational agreement that was entered to source 
                                                     
5  The method employed in this paper is slightly different from the method by Ahuja and Katila (2001). 
Ahuja and Katila (2001) included also deals for which they found press releases indicating technology as a 
specific motivation for undertaking the M&A. Since we had no access to these press releases, we could 
only include deals in which the partner has applied for at least one patent. 
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external technology. The different sourcing modes are non-equity technology alliances, CVC 
investments, minority holdings, joint ventures and M&As. As argued before, these modes incorporate 
a full range of options that can be ranked along the continuum between arms-length arrangements and 
full integration (Williamson, 1985; Powell, 1990; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Non-equity 
technology alliances are defined as ‘cooperative efforts in which two or more separate organizations, 
while maintaining their own corporate identities, join forces to share reciprocal inputs’ (Vanhaverbeke 
et al., 2002). Strategic alliances come closest to market transactions and are hence the most flexible 
form of cooperation, entailing a relatively low level of control over its partner. CVC investments and 
minority holdings, in which the investing company takes a minority share in another firm, are also a 
flexible form of cooperation, though the level of control is greater than in strategic alliances, partly 
because of the equity participation. CVC investments can be defined as ‘equity investments by 
established corporations in entrepreneurial ventures’ (Dushnitksy and Lenox, 2006), whereas minority 
holdings are regarded as ‘partnership in which one of the firms takes a less than 50 percent equity 
position in the other firm’. Joint ventures represent a higher level of integration, due to the increasing 
involvement of equity and require the formation of a new organizational entity by the partners. M&As 
represent the highest level of hierarchy and are defined as ‘cumulative ownership of 50 percent or 
more of a partner firm’ (Folta, 1998). The different modes are labeled according to their supposed 
level of integration, which allows us to perform an ordinal logistic regression. Non-equity technology 
alliances, being closest to arms-length transactions, are coded 1, followed respectively by CVC 
investments (2), minority holdings (3), joint ventures (4) and M&As (5), being the mostly integrated 
governance mode.  
 
Independent variables 
Table 1 provides an overview of the variables. Following the hypotheses, independent variables 
include environmental turbulence, technological newness, the technological distance between the 
investing firm and the partnering or target firm and prior cooperation between them.  The independent 
variables environmental turbulence, technological newness, and technological distance, as well as the 
control variable technological capital, are calculated using patent data as an indicator for 
technological knowledge. Prior research has pointed towards the fact that technological knowledge 
depreciates sharply over time (e.g. Grilliches, 1979), losing most of its value within five years. 
Therefore, a five year moving window is used to calculate most of our variables. Other studies using 
patent data as an indicator for technological knowledge have for that reason also used five years 
moving windows (e.g. Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Stuart, 2000). 
 
 
< Insert Table 1 around here >  
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Environmental turbulence refers to the technological change over time. The measurement is based on 
patent classes that are relevant for the pharmaceutical companies in our sample. To determine the 
relevant technological fields, we took the 80% most important patent classes based on the patent 
applications of the focal firms during the observation period. Because our sample firms are largely 
diversified, 80% is taken rather than 100% in order to overcome too much noise in the calculation of 
this variable. Next, for these patent classes, we calculated for each year the number of patent 
applications worldwide6. To determine the similarities of the patent distributions of two subsequent 
observation years, we calculated the Pearson correlation coefficient ρ. Technological turbulence is 
then calculated as 1- ρ, so that higher numbers indicate higher levels of technological turbulence. This 
variable is lagged one year.  
 Technological newness is a firm-level variable, which is developed in a two-step process. 
First, we determine the age of all patent classes. This is calculated as the median of the age7 of all 
patents in a patent class in a particular year. To overcome outlier bias, we use the median age rather 
than the average to calculate the age. Second, to calculate the average technological age per firm, we 
multiply the share of patent applications by the technology age for each patent class. Technological 
newness is then calculated as -1 * technology age, such that higher values represent a higher level of 
technological newness. 
 Technological distance refers to the (lack of) overlap between the knowledge base of the 
investing company and the knowledge that is acquired externally. We use the method developed by 
Jaffe (1986) to calculate the technological proximity between two firms (i and j). Following this 
method, the technological proximity between two firms is computed as the uncentered correlation 
between their respective vectors of technological capital (measured as the cumulative patent 
applications in technology class k over the five years prior to the investment), Pik and Pjk 
respectively:  
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The technological proximity (Tij) measure takes a value between 0 and 1 according to their common 
technological interests. To calculate technological distance, this variable is transformed into a new 
one, which equals1 . ijT−
 The variable prior cooperation is a count variable, indicating the number of previous 
cooperation efforts between the focal firm and the partner firm in the five years prior to the 
observation year (Gulati, 1995).  
 
                                                     
6 We use all patent applications in a particular year rather than only the patents of the focal firms. Hence, this 
variable is not dependent on the firm sample. 
7 The age of the patent is the time elapsed between the application year and the year of observation. 
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Control variables 
The decision to enter a specific technology sourcing mode can also be affected by factors, other than 
environmental and relation specific uncertainty. We therefore included a number of control variables 
to capture firm-specific characteristics.  
Prior experience with particular governance modes might lead to the development of certain 
capabilities that enhance the effectiveness of managing these governance modes (Rothaermel and 
Deeds, 2006). As a result, prior experience might result in the preference of a particular governance 
modes over others (e.g. Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005). Therefore, 
we included the control variable experience, indicating the firm's experience with respect to particular 
modes of technology sourcing in the five years prior to the investment under study. Furthermore, we 
added technological capital to measure the firm's technological strength (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002). 
This variable is computed as the cumulative number of patents applied for by the focal firm in the five 
years prior to the investment under study.  
 Furthermore, we controlled for size (natural logarithm of sales) and R&D expenditures as a 
percentage of sales. Both variables are lagged by one year. Finally, we introduced dummy variables 
to capture industry and country specific effects. The yearly dummy variables capture eventual 
changes in preference for particular governance modes. In this way we can control for instance for the 
booming venture capital markets, the increasing popularity of corporate venture capital or other 
developments in the environment. 
 
Methods 
The dataset used is set up as a cross sectional database where each record represents an inter-
organizational relationship of any of the types. In this analysis, it is appropriate to use an ordered logit 
model to estimate the effect of uncertainty on the choice between less and more integrated governance 
modes. Ordered logistic regressions control for the ordered nature of the dependent variable. 
Following the literature (Williamson, 1985; Powell, 1990; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991), we argue 
that the dependent variable can be ranked along a continuum from less to more integration: non-
equity, technology alliances being the most arms-length relationship, moving to CVC investments, 
which are still highly flexible though more integrated as a result of their equity component, followed 
respectively by minority holdings, joint ventures and mergers and acquisitions on the other end of the 
continuum representing the highest level of integration in the company. Although the first results of 
this estimation procedure seemed to be in line with the hypothesized signs (Appendix I), it must be 
noted that in the ordinal logit model the parallel regression assumption, which assumes that the 
relationship between each pair of outcome groups is the same, should hold. The parallel regression 
assumption was tested using the Wald test by Brant (1990), showing that this assumption was violated 
for most of the independent variables (Appendix II). As a result, the ordinal logit model was rejected. 
Although according to Long and Freese (2003) the parallel regression assumption is often violated, 
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the results for our model imply that ranking the different modes for technology sourcing along a 
continuum from less to more integration, is more complicated than literature suggests.8
 Since the ordinal logistic regression model, is rejected, we replaced it by a multinomial logit 
model. This model does not take into account any order in the dependent variable and is therefore an 
interesting mechanism to test the hypotheses. Since there is no predetermined ordening, the results of 
the multinomial logit can provide a more detailed insight in when particular governance modes are 
preferred over other, depending on the circumstances. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables.  
 
< Insert Table 2 around here > 
 
The results of the multinomial logit estimates are presented in Table 3 below.9 Both models show the 
estimates of the choice of corporate venture capital investments (CVC), minority holdings (MH), joint 
ventures (JV) and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) over the default category of non-equity alliances. 
Model 1 includes the results for the control variables only, whereas Model 2 also incorporates the 
independent variables. Some of the high correlations between some of the independent variables in 
Table 2 indicate possible multi-collinearity problems. We therefore estimated different models, 
excluding some of the variables with high correlations from the analyses. The results are very similar 
to the ones presented in Table 3, indicating that these results are robust. 
 
<insert Table 3 around here> 
 
Table 3 only shows the estimates for each category against the default category (non-equity alliances). 
To check whether there is still a differential effect of the independent variables on the different 
governance modes, we can use the odds ratios presented in Table 4. This table decomposes the effect 
of the independent variables on the governance mode choice into binary choice models. Each binary 
choice is represented in a different column, where values greater than 1 indicate a significant effect in 
the hypothesized direction, and a value smaller than 1 indicates a significant effect in the opposite 
direction. Non-significant results are not included. 
                                                     
8 We will get back to the implications of these results in the discussion section. 
9 An underlying assumption in the multinomial logit model is the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). 
We used the Hausman and McFadden (1984) test to check if the null hypotheses ((H0: Outcome-J vs 
Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives) could be rejected and found that the IIA assumption has 
not been violated (Appendix III). 
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<insert Table 4 around here> 
 
The results in Table 3 partially support the hypotheses. Environmental turbulence is expected to have 
a positive effect on the use of less integrated governance modes (Hypothesis 1). The results in Table 3 
indicate that environmental uncertainty has a negative effect on the choice of CVC investments, 
minority holdings, joint ventures and M&As over non-equity alliances. The odds ratios in Table 4 
furthermore show that the environmental turbulence also negatively affects the choice of joint 
ventures over CVC investments, minority holdings and M&As, and that of M&As over minority 
holdings. Clearly, under high levels of environmental turbulence, non-equity technology alliances are 
the most favorable option. CVC investments, minority holdings and M&As are favored over joint 
ventures, and minority holdings are preferred over M&As, but the data show no significant 
differential effect of environmental turbulence on the preference for CVC investments over minority 
holdings or M&As. As a result, the first hypothesis is partly supported by the data, as strategic 
alliances are the most favorable option, but we did not find a linear ranking from less to more 
integrated governance modes.  
 The second hypothesis, predicting that technological newness of the partner's technology has 
a positive effect on the use of less integrated governance modes, is partially supported by the results. 
The results presented in Table 3 show that technological newness has indeed a strong, negative effect 
on the likelihood of using M&As and joint ventures instead of non-equity alliances. However, the 
results also imply that when the technology is new, CVC investments are preferred over non-equity 
alliances and minority holdings, which in turn are preferred over joint ventures and M&As. Thus, 
contrary to our expectations, technological newness leads only to some extent to the use of less 
integrated governance modes: while M&As and joint ventures become less attractive, there is a clear 
preference for the companies in this study to choose CVC investments over all other governance 
modes. This result shows that the uncertainty related to the newness of partners' technology is 
considered by the focal firms as different from technological turbulence. When technological 
turbulence is high, alliances are preferred over CVC investments, and the reverse holds in case the 
partners' technology is new.  
 Hypothesis 3a predicts that technological distance between partnering firms requires more 
integrated governance modes. The opposite was proposed by Hypotheses 3b. The results in Table 3 
partially corroborate Hypothesis 3a, since a positive, significant effect is found of the likelihood to use 
CVC investments over non-equity alliances under higher levels of technological distance. However, 
technological distance between partners does also lead to a preference for non-equity alliances over 
minority holdings, and no differential effect is found between non-equity alliances and joint ventures 
and M&As. The odds ratios in Table 4 furthermore show that when technological distance between 
firms increases, there is an increased tendency to use CVC investments over non-equity alliances and 
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non-equity alliances over minority holdings. CVC investments are also preferred over joint ventures 
and M&As, which in turn are preferred over minority holdings. Hence, there is no linear relationship 
between technological distance and the governance modes discussed here, since we find partial 
evidence for both Hypotheses 3a and 3b. The strong preference for CVCs to source externally 
developed technology that is distant from the focal firms technology core shows the particular role 
CVC investments play in external technology sourcing.    
 Based on the results in Table 3 and Table 4, we find some evidence for Hypothesis 4a as well 
as for Hypothesis 4b. Hypothesis 4a predicts that prior cooperation has a positive effect on the use of 
more integrated governance modes, whereas Hypothesis 4b predicts the opposite. Prior cooperation 
with a partnering firm increases the likelihood of using minority holdings and joint ventures as 
opposed to non-equity alliances, though the results in Table 4 show no significant result for the choice 
between joint ventures and minority holdings. Table 4 furthermore shows some preference for 
minority holdings and joint ventures over strategic alliances and M&As, which points in the direction 
of both Hypotheses 4a and 4b. 
 To shed some more light on the propensity of firms to use a particular type of governance 
under certain levels of uncertainty, we have calculated the predicted probabilities under varying levels 
of both exogenous and endogenous uncertainty. Recall that exogenous uncertainty incorporates 
environmental turbulence and technological newness, and that endogenous uncertainty is proxied by 
technological distance and prior cooperation. 
 
<insert table 5 about here> 
 
Table 5 shows that when both exogenous and endogenous uncertainty decreases, the predicted use of 
more integrated governance modes increases, whereas the likelihood of strategic alliances decreases 
significantly. Moreover, when both types of uncertainty are high, i.e. when the relationship is subject 
to maximum uncertainty, less integrated governance modes are preferred over more integrated ones. 
However, the situations in which only one type of uncertainty is high and the other one is low are 
interesting. When looking for instance at the situation in which endogenous uncertainty is low and 
exogenous uncertainty is high, the likelihood of using non-equity alliances increases from 47 to 69%, 
showing the importance of flexibility when the source of the uncertainty is beyond control of the firm. 
However, when exogenous uncertainty is low and endogenous uncertainty is high, the propensity to 
use M&As increases from 34 to 51%. Thus, explaining how firms source technologies for new 
business development under varying levels of uncertainty requires the combination of multiple 
perspectives on uncertainty.  
 The results for the control variables also deserve some attention. The dummy variables 
indicate that the pharmaceutical companies are more involved in technology alliances and less in 
minority holdings, joint ventures and acquisitions. There are also institutional influences: both Asian 
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and European companies prefer alliances over CVC investments. In addition, large firms prefer CVC 
investments and minority holdings to non-equity alliances. Finally, prior experience with a particular 
governance mode is not per se related to a preference for that mode over another. As shown in Table 
3, alliance experience has a positive effect on the choice of alliances over CVC investments, minority 
holdings, and M&As, but no effect on the choice of joint ventures. Similarly, CVC experience is 
related to the choice of CVC investments over strategic alliances, but also to the choice of M&As 
over alliances, and alliances over minority holdings. Experience with M&As increases the likelihood 
of choosing M&As over alliances, and interestingly, minority holdings and joint venture experience 
does not lead to the choice of any of the governance modes over alliances. Although prior studies 
have argued that firms build governance-form specific capabilities through the experience with 
different governance modes (e.g. Dyer and Singh, 1998; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006; Villalonga and 
McGahan, 2005), our results suggest that this does not necessarily lead to a preference for that 
particular governance mode over another.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this study we have tested the effect of both exogenous and endogenous uncertainty on the choice 
between non-equity technology alliances, corporate venture capital investments, minority holdings, 
joint ventures and mergers and acquisitions. We tested several hypotheses about the impact of 
exogenous and endogenous uncertainty on this choice. The results provide varying levels of support 
for these hypotheses. 
 In the discussion leading to the first hypothesis we have argued that there is a positive 
relationship between high environmental uncertainty and the use of less integrated governance modes. 
Although the preference for CVC over minority holdings and M&As is still unclear, the results show 
how non-equity alliances are the preferred mechanism to deal with unforeseen contingencies, whereas 
joint ventures are the least favorable. This is consistent with prior studies on environmental turbulence 
(e.g. Folta, 1998; Moon, 1998; Santoro and McGill, 2005), indicating that under higher levels of 
environmental turbulence, companies need to remain flexible, by making small, reversible 
investments. Contrary to our expectations, M&As are not the least preferred option. Although this 
seems to be somewhat surprising, it should be noted that in the pharmaceutical sector, the acquisition 
of small biotech companies is an important mechanism to gain access to new technologies. Even 
under high levels of environmental turbulence, acquiring a small firm is more attractive than setting 
up a whole new organizational entity (i.e. joint venture). 
 The second hypothesis predicted that a higher level of technological newness of the partner 
firm, will lead to an increased use of less integrated governance modes. We hypothesized that due to 
the highly uncertain outcomes, flexibility to withdraw from the commitment is an important asset 
companies need to cope with this uncertainty. The results only partially confirm the hypotheses, 
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suggesting a preference for non-equity alliances and minority holdings over joint ventures and M&As, 
though showing that CVC investments are clearly preferred to the other governance modes. Prior 
research also indicated the preference for strategic alliances over M&As in the earlier stages of the 
technology life cycle (e.g. Lambe and Spekman, 1997), but their discussion is restricted to these two 
governance modes. On the other hand, researchers studying the use of CVC investments have pointed 
towards the fact that these investments are particularly oriented towards "having a window on 
emerging technologies" (Chesbrough, 2002; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2006; Keil, 2002; Siegel et al., 
1988), which might explain why CVC investments are preferred over strategic, non-equity alliances. 
In addition, although the possible outcomes of emerging technologies are uncertain, the possible 
return when an emerging technology turns out to be a success is much higher compared to the more 
incremental innovations based on mature technologies (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). This might induce 
companies facing new technologies to opt for equity strategies in order to get some control and as the 
creation of an option for the future. 
 The alternative hypotheses 3a and 3b predicted that technological distance between partnering 
firms induces the firms to use less (more) integrated governance modes. We found mixed results, 
partially confirming both hypotheses. Although the results show no effect for the use of strategic 
alliances as opposed to joint ventures and M&As under these circumstances, the outcomes show once 
more a clear preference among companies to source distant technologies through CVC arrangements. 
This effect for CVC investments corresponds with the findings of Dushnitksy (2004). He analyzed the 
relationship between an investing firm and an entrepreneur and came to the conclusion that this 
relationship is less likely to materialize when the products of the two are substitutes, i.e. when both 
parties operate in the same industry. The results also provide some evidence for the largely 
explorative nature of CVC investments. Interestingly, the results also show a clear differential effect 
for CVC investments and minority holdings, supporting our arguments that although CVC and 
minority holdings can both be regarded as minority equity investments, they are clearly used by 
investing firms as two distinct mechanisms of external technology sourcing. 
 The last two alternative hypotheses (4a and b) predicted a positive effect of prior cooperation 
the use of more (less) integrated governance modes. We find that minority holdings and joint ventures 
are preferred over non-equity alliances, but we also find that these strategies are preferred over 
M&As. Although this might indicate some support for both hypotheses 4a and 4b, one should be 
careful when interpreting these results. After a strategic alliance or CVC investment, the investing 
firm might opt to increase commitment and take a minority participation in its partner or form a joint 
venture. In line with earlier findings of Hagedoorn and Sadowski (1999), our results also show that 
prior cooperation does not necessarily lead to an M&A. 
 Another important finding of this study is that we found no empirical support for the 
proposition that different inter-organizational modes can be ranked along a market-hierarchy 
continuum as has been argued by many scholars on theoretical grounds (e.g. Gulati and Singh, 1998; 
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Hagedoorn and Sadowski, 1999; Nielsen, 2002; Santoro and McGill, 2005; Villalonga and McGahan, 
2005; Williamson, 1985). The results of the Brant test prove that ranking external governance choices 
(by means of an ordinal logit regression) to reflect the market-hierarchy continuum is not supported 
by the data. The multinomial logit estimates show that some ranking among the governance modes is 
possible, but they also suggest that this ranking is not linear as suggested by the previously mentioned 
continuum. On the contrary, the ranking is sometimes partial and is to some extent different 
depending on the proxies we have used for both external and relational uncertainty. The benefits of 
using a particular type of external technology sourcing mode are contingent on the external and 
relational uncertainty. This implies that each governance mode has its own strengths and weaknesses 
to cope with environmental turbulence, emerging technologies, technological distance between 
partners and technology sourcing in the wake of prior cooperation. Hence, the empirical analysis 
suggests that companies make use of different external technology sourcing modes depending on the 
type of uncertainty they have to cope with. External technology sourcing is contingent on the type of 
uncertainty, which, in turn, leads to a more complex understanding of external technology sourcing as 
suggested by the continuum in terms of more or less integrated modes.     
 Overall we feel that this paper has contributed to three main areas of study: First, we have 
highlighted an important and often understudied topic, i.e. the role of uncertainty in government mode 
choice. Furthermore we increased the theoretical and empirical importance of this paper by expanding 
number of mode-types compared to previous studies. This is an important feature because it reflects 
the current state of external venturing in which firms have a full array of options to fulfill their basic 
needs for technology development and acquisition. Finally, the empirical results give evidence that a 
linear continuum of external technology modes as has been suggested in the literature is too simplistic 
to understand the technology based cooperation between innovating firms.    
 The current study clearly has a number of limitations. First, prior cooperation between the 
two firms in the dyad should be decomposed into the different types of external technology sourcing 
modes. As suggested in the literature streams on real options, certain types of investment might be 
considered as the creation of an option, which might be exercised at a later point in time using a more 
integrated solution (e.g. Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Hagedoorn and Sadowski, 1999; Haspeslagh and 
Jamison, 1991; Kogut, 1991; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002). If we want to shed more light on this theory, 
it is necessary to split up prior cooperation into the specific modes in which prior cooperation existed. 
Next, prior cooperation should also be differentiated in terms of the partner's characteristics: a 
minority holding in a small (high-tech) firm will probably have a different effect on follow-up 
cooperative agreements compared to a minority holding in larger firms.  
 Furthermore, although we have tested the impact of different types of uncertainty on 
governance mode choice, future research should also look into the possible moderating effects of 
uncertainty. For instance, prior cooperation might interact with the effect of different types of 
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uncertainty on governance mode choice. Moreover, the effect of uncertainty on governance mode 
decisions might differently affect industry leaders and laggards.10
 An additional limitation of this study stems from the lack of data about partners and the 
relationship under study. In many cases partners are small firms that are not publicly owned but 
financed by private equity owners. As a result, it is extremely difficult to obtain financial information 
about these partners. This limitation excludes the possibility to measure the impact of partner 
characteristics on the choice of focal firms between external governance modes. Moreover, it might 
be the case that inter-firm ties differ along various dimensions, other than the ones discussed here. It is 
very likely that different resources are funneled through different modes. For example, non-equity 
alliances could serve solely for technological-collaboration whereas CVC is a channel to distribute 
capital as well. Further research should analyze how different modes channel these different types of 
resources. In addition, including more information on the inter-firm relationship level enables further 
insight on the impact of collaboration-specific issues.  
 Moreover, this is to our knowledge the first empirical study comparing CVC investments with 
strategic alliances and mergers and acquisitions as alternative modes to source externally developed 
technology. Hence, additional research in this area might be fruitful. Although CVC investments do 
impose a condition on the partner firm, i.e. the partner firm should be a start-up, its value as an 
alternative and complementary means to get access to new technologies is apparent. Further research 
in this field could go into the direction of not only predicting when CVC should be preferred over 
other governance modes, but should also focus on the advantages and disadvantages of this mode for 
technology sourcing as opposed to the other the other modes. One topic which definitely needs more 
attention is the differential impact of these technology sourcing modes on the innovation and financial 
performance of focal firms. 
 
                                                     
10 We thank one anonymous reviewer for pointing us to this. 
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Variable Description Hypothesis Sign 
Type of investment Categorical variable indicating the type of inter-organizational 
relationship under study. Set to 1 for non-equity technology alliances, 
2 for CVC investments, 3 for equity alliances, and 4 for mergers and 
acquisitions. 
dependent 
variable 
 
Technology alliance 
experience 
Number of technology alliances by firm i prior to the investment 
under study (t-1 to t-5) 
  
CVC experience Number of CVC investments by firm i prior to the investment under 
study (t-1 to t-5) 
  
Minority holding experience Number of minority holdings by firm i prior to the investment under 
study (t-1 to t-5) 
  
Joint venture experience Number of joint ventures by firm i prior to the investment under study 
(t-1 to t-5) 
  
M&A experience Number of mergers and acquisitions by firm i prior to the investment 
under study (t-1 to t-5) 
  
R&D to sales Research and development expenses divided by sales for firm i in year 
t-1 
  
Size Natural logarithm of sales by firm i in year t-1   
Environmental turbulence Changes in patent applications in the industry prior to the investment 
under study (t-1) 
1 - 
Technological newness Weighted average technological age of classes in which the patent 
applications of the dyad partner took place (t-1 to t-5) 
2 - 
Technological distance Technological distance between the focal firm and its dyad partner, 
based on their respective patent portfolios prior to the investment (t-1 
to t-5) 
3a, 3b +,- 
Prior cooperation Number of prior cooperation efforts with the partner firm prior to the 
investment under study (t-1 to t-5)  
4a, 4b +, - 
Year Dummy variables indicating a particular year (1991-2000, default is 
1990) 
  
Dummy pharma Dummy variable set to one if the firm is a pharmaceutical company 
(default is non-pharma firms) 
  
Dummy Europe Dummy variable set to one if the firm is headquartered in Europe 
(default is US) 
  
Dummy Japan Dummy variable set to one if the firm is headquartered in Japan 
(default is US) 
  
 
Table 1 Definition of variables 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) alliance experience 8.09 7.55                          
(2) CVC experience 1.70 5.27 .18                        
(3) minority holding experience 2.01 2.15 .43 .30                      
(4) joint venture experience 1.57 2.37 .58 .02 .06                    
(5) M&A experience 4.44 3.85 .38 .42 .29 .37                  
(6) R&D to sales 0.08 0.09 -.05 -.01 .13 -.22 -.19                
(7) Size 9.45 1.43 .08 .07 .04 .13 .12 -.40              
(8) Dummy Europe 0.39 0.49 .08 -.18 -.09 .13 .15 -.09 .03            
(9) Dummy Japan 0.05 0.22 -.22 -.07 -.18 -.11 -.23 -.06 .55 -.18          
(10) Dummy pharma 0.52 0.50 .02 .12 .21 -.33 -.07 .45 -.01 .07 -.02        
(11) Environmental turbulence 1.60 1.41 -.06 -.12 .03 -.11 -.04 .01 .00 .01 .00 .07      
(12) Technological newness -10.43 3.29 .00 .15 .18 -.15 -.06 .24 -.08 -.16 -.01 .29 .02    
(13) Technological distance 0.69 0.28 .07 .02 -.10 .18 .13 -.21 .04 .04 -.05 -.22 -.07 -.19  
(14) Prior cooperation 0.20 0.61 .16 .11 .13 .14 .16 -.01 .00 -.01 -.05 .01 .00 .01 -.04 
a. Year dummy variables not included in the table; the highest correlation is 0.36 between year 2000 and CVC experience.
 
Table 3 Multinomial logit estimates 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 CVC MH JV M&A CVC MH JV M&A 
Constant -2.614** -1.805** 0.351 2.154*** -3.570** -1.684* -1.492 0.748 
 (1.292) (0.829) (0.974) (0.673) (1.476) (0.928) (1.056) (0.736) 
         
Alliance  -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.005 -0.062*** -0.077*** -0.070*** -0.012 -0.066*** 
experience (0.026) (0.019) (0.017) (0.012) (0.027) (0.019) (0.017) (0.012) 
         
CVC experience 0.182*** -0.092* -0.096 0.063* 0.183*** -0.090* -0.088 0.073* 
 (0.048) (0.053) (0.059) (0.036) (0.049) (0.053) (0.058) (0.038) 
         
Minority holding  0.106 0.037 -0.082 -0.042 0.121 0.012 -0.059 -0.022 
experience (0.069) (0.047) (0.065) (0.036) (0.075) (0.048) (0.067) (0.036) 
         
Joint venture  -0.088 -0.022 -0.027 0.015 -0.089 -0.032 -0.044 0.007 
experience (0.085) (0.058) (0.057) (0.039) (0.087) (0.059) (0.057) (0.040) 
         
M&A experience 0.026 0.019 0.050 0.069*** 0.008 0.013 0.040 0.066*** 
 (0.040) (0.031) (0.034) (0.021) (0.041) (0.032) (0.034) (0.021) 
         
R&D to Sales -2.383 1.468* 0.701 -3.437 -2.604 1.527* 1.458 -2.024 
 (2.346) (0.754) (2.671) (2.593) (2.896) (0.784) (1.879) (2.009) 
         
Size 0.271** 0.236*** 0.031 -0.054 0.365** 0.268*** 0.029 -0.057 
 (0.132) (0.084) (0.093) (0.065) (0.155) (0.088) (0.090) (0.066) 
         
Dummy Europe -0.521* -0.124 0.504** 0.472*** -0.482* -0.124 0.409* 0.375*** 
 (0.284) (0.197) (0.220) (0.136) (0.287) (0.200) (0.228) (0.140) 
         
Dummy Japan -2.703** -0.843* 0.078 0.451 -3.016** -1.020** 0.117 0.470 
 (1.138) (0.506) (0.657) (0.356) (1.220) (0.519) (0.646) (0.370) 
         
Dummy Pharma -0.202 -0.671*** -1.316*** -0.668*** -0.154 -0.736*** -1.132*** -0.542*** 
 (0.316) (0.191) (0.316) (0.209) (0.339) (0.201) (0.292) (0.189) 
         
Environmental      -0.319*** -0.211** -0.568*** -0.377*** 
turbulence     (0.118) (0.107) (0.116) (0.077) 
         
Technological      0.101*** -0.017 -0.174*** -0.146*** 
newness     (0.037) (0.031) (0.037) (0.020) 
         
Technological      1.632*** -0.653** 0.417 0.110 
distance     (0.510) (0.293) (0.412) (0.244) 
         
Prior cooperation     0.133 0.421*** 0.397*** 0.100 
     (0.151) (0.122) (0.143) (0.122) 
         
Log Likelihood -2120.17    -2057.56    
Prob>Chi2 0.0000    0.0000    
Pseudo R2 0.1299     0.1556    
a. Non-equity, technology alliances is the comparison group   
b. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
c. Year dummy variables were included in the analyses, but not in the table 
d. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
e. N = 1810 
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Table 4 Effect of the independent variables on the choice between external governance modes 
(e^bStdX) (a) 
 
 SD CVC 
over SA 
MH 
over SA 
JV over 
SA 
M&A 
over SA 
MH 
over 
CVC 
JV over 
CVC 
M&A 
over 
CVC 
JV over 
MH 
M&A 
over 
MH 
M&A 
over JV 
1.41 0.6378 0.7426 0.4492 0.5882 n.s. 0.7043 n.s. 0.6049 0.7921 1.3095 
Environmental 
turbulence 
 
&
SA CVC JV
SA MH M A JV
> >
> > >  
3.29 1.3944 n.s. 0.5647 0.6188 0.6776 0.4050 0.4438 0.5976 0.6549 n.s. Technological 
newness  , ,CVC SA MH JV M A> > &  
0.28 1.5674 0.8354 n.s. n.s. 0.5330 0.7155 0.6577 1.3426 1.2340 n.s. 
Technological 
distance 
 
, &
CVC SA MH
CVC JV M A MH
> >
> >  
0.61 n.s. 1.2927 1.2733 n.s. 1.1921 n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.8221 0.8346 
Prior 
cooperation 
 , , &MH JV SA M A
MH CVC
>
>  
a. Table reports change in odds for SD increase of X based on Model 2 in Table 3 
b. n.s. = not significant 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Predicted probabilities 
 
 Low 
Exogenous uncertainty 
High 
Exogenous uncertainty 
 SA CVC MH JV M&A SA CVC MH JV M&A 
All variables to sample mean 47 4 10 5 34 47 4 10 5 34 
           
Low 
Endogenous uncertainty 
29 2 8 9 52 69 3 10 1 17 
           
High 
Endogenous uncertainty 
23 4 8 14 51 62 8 10 2 18 
a. Predicted probabilities with all other variables in the sample mean 
b. Non-dummy variables are taken as mean plus (high) or minus (low) one standard deviation (Belderbos 
and Sleuwaegen, 2005) 
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Appendix I  Ordinal logit estimates 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Type Type 
Intercept 1 -2.193 -1.163 
 (0.538) (0.570) 
Intercept 2 -1.873 -0.834 
 (0.537) (0.570) 
Intercept 3 -1.350 -0.291 
 (0.535) (0.568) 
Intercept 4 -1.010 0.061 
 (0.535) (0.569) 
   
Alliance experience -0.045*** -0.046*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) 
CVC experience 0.005 0.012 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Minority holding experience -0.037 -0.021 
 (0.027) (0.027) 
Joint venture experience 0.015 0.008 
 (0.033) (0.033) 
M&A experience 0.058*** 0.051*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) 
R&D to sales -1.604 -0.992 
 (1.312) (1.043) 
Size -0.046 -0.057 
 (0.056) (0.056) 
Dummy Europe 0.361*** 0.304*** 
 (0.105) (0.107) 
Dummy Japan 0.405 0.442 
 (0.299) (0.304) 
Dummy pharma -0.658*** -0.530*** 
 (0.140) (0.133) 
   
Environmental turbulence  -0.268*** 
  (0.050) 
Technological newness  -0.114*** 
  (0.015) 
Technological distance  0.103 
  (0.183) 
Prior cooperation  0.058 
  (0.072) 
   
Observations 1810 1810 
a. Year dummy variables were included in the analyses, but not in the table 
b. Robust standard errors in parentheses   
c. significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Appendix II Brant Test of Parallel Regression Assumption 
 
Variable chi2 p>chi2 df 
All 307.05 0.000 69 
alliance experience 15.81 0.001 3 
CVC experience 12.41 0.006 3 
minority holding experience 4.10 0.251 3 
joint venture experience 4.26 0.235 3 
M&A experience 2.20 0.531 3 
R&S to sales -2.92 -999.000 3 
Size 16.98 0.001 3 
Dummy Europe 2.42 0.490 3 
Dummy Japan 9.72 0.021 3 
Dummy pharma 9.76 0.021 3 
Environmental turbulence 9.91 0.019 3 
Technological newness 25.01 0.000 3 
Technological distance 23.92 0.000 3 
Prior cooperation 8.89 0.031 3 
a. Year dummy variables not included in the table 
 
A significant test statistic provides evidence that the parallel regression assumption has been violated. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix III Hausman tests of IIA assumption 
 
Ho: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives. 
 
Omitted chi2 df P>chi2 evidence 
1 -20.737 70 1.000 for Ho     
2 -1.916 71 1.000 for Ho     
3 5.470 71 1.000 for Ho     
4 3.817 71 1.000 for Ho     
5 18.099 70 1.000 for Ho     
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